Can free will and determinism work together?

Determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility because determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.

Does determinism undermine free will?

Since determinism implies that agents could not have done otherwise once initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed, it follows that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism.

Which view attempts to reconcile freedom and responsibility with determinism?

The Cambridge philosopher G.E. Moore (1873–1958) attempted to reconcile determinism and free will through a conditional analysis of freedom. When one says that a person acted freely, according to Moore, one simply means that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, he would have done otherwise.

Does libertarian free will accept determinism?

Libertarians believe that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, and agents have free will. They therefore deny that causal determinism is true. Non-causal libertarians typically believe that free actions are constituted by basic mental actions, such as a decision or choice.

Can you have internal determinism and external free will?

So as a result, free will can influence our destiny and future. As the final result, it is not possible to have external determinism and internal free will.

What is the philosophical problem of free will and determinism?

Much of the philosophical interest in the free will/determinism problem is motivated by concerns about moral responsibility because, it is generally agreed, having free will is a necessary condition of being morally responsible. So if determinism precludes free will, it also precludes moral responsibility.

Does Chisholm believe in free will?

Chisholm’s Libertarianism: Explaining freewill does not require strict indeterminism, i.e., the claim that free acts are not caused. ∎ So, to explain free will without adopting indeterminism, Chisholm claims that free acts are not uncaused, but are caused by “agents,” and not (solely) by previous events.